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An investigation of dependence in expert
judgement studies with multiple experts
Abstract
Expert judgement plays an important role in forecasting and else-
where as it can be used to quantify models when no data are available
and to improve predictions from models when combined with data. In
order to provide defensible estimates of unknowns in an analysis the
judgements of multiple experts can be elicited. Mathematical aggrega-
tion methods can be used to combine these individual judgements into
a single judgement for the decision maker. However, most mathemati-
cal aggregation methods assume judgements coming from experts that
are independent. This is unlikely to be the case in practice. This paper
investigates dependence in expert judgement studies, both within and
between experts. It gives the most comprehensive analysis to date by
considering all studies in the TU Delft database. It then assesses the
practical significance of the dependencies identified in the studies by
comparing the performance of several mathematical aggregation meth-
ods with varying dependence assumptions. Between expert correlations
were more prevalent than within expert correlations. For studies which
contained between expert correlations, models which include these im-
proved forecasts. The implications for the use of expert judgement in
forecasting are discussed.
Keywords: Expert judgement, dependency, mathematical aggregation, Bayesian
methods, finance
1 Introduction
Expert judgement has been used in forecasting informally when data aren’t
available and formally to bound problems, qualitatively structure models and
quantify unknowns within models. One example in DeWispelare et al [14]
used expert judgements to estimate the probabilities within high-level nuclear
waste regulation. Probabilistic forecasts were elicited from five climatologists
on parameters of complex climatic models. In a very different application,
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Brandt et al [4] considered the evaluation of forecasts in political conflict dy-
namics. They considered forecasts from analysts of densities and the impor-
tance of taking uncertainty in forecasts into account when evaluating models.
Jochmann et al [19] considered the use of expert judgement VAR forecast-
ing in combination with data. They identified model parameters over which
prior uncertainty distributions could be elicited from experts and indicated
that this approach offers improvements in accuracy over a solely data driven
model. As we see, expert judgement can be used on its own when there are
no data available or in combination with data in a Bayesian analysis. In both
cases we require a procedure to obtain the expert judgements we require.
An important question in any expert judgement study is whose judgements
to elicit. That is, what constitutes an expert? There are various views on
this. In a pure subjectivist Bayesian analysis then the expert could simply
be the person from whom the unknowns are being elicited. However, if we
are considering the expert problem [15] in which experts are being asked for
advice from a specific decision maker, then the role of expert will require
more justification. Instead, we may use a definition from [16] that experts
are “persons to whom society and/or his peers attribute special knowledge
about the matters being elicited”. Crucially, it is also the ability to use this
knowledge that defines a good expert [28]. For discussion on the selection
of experts see Sections 1.3 and 5 of [16]. In the expert problem multiple
experts are typically used to improve the information given to the decision
maker.
When performing elicitation, questions must always be asked about quanti-
ties which are relevant to the expert, rather than abstract model parameters.
Typically questions are put to experts about probabilities or quantiles and
then these are converted to the parameters of probability distributions by the
analyst. However, there is much evidence in the psychological literature that
humans are susceptible to heuristics and biases when giving quantitative as-
sessments such as these and efforts must be made in any elicitation to minimise
the influence of these biases. Three common heuristics which can lead to such
biases are judgement by representativeness; evaluating probabilities of events
based on how similar two things are while ignoring base rates, judgement by
availability; basing probabilities of events on how easily the events can be re-
called and anchoring; the expert is given an irrelevant value for the probability
of an event and then inadequately adjusts this up or down based on how likely
they think this event is. In particular, availability and representativeness can
shift elicited probabilities and anchoring can result in quantiles which are too
narrow, resulting in incorrect probability distributions. For more information
on heuristics and biases see [21, 31].
When multiple experts give judgements in a study it may be necessary, or at
least preferable, to combine their judgements into a single coherent judgement
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to report back to the decision maker. There are two main ways to do this:
behavioural aggregation and mathematical aggregation. In behavioural aggre-
gation the experts are typically brought together into a single place and the
objective is to come to a consensus about each quantity in the analysis. When
is is not possible to bring experts together, and to avoid biases resulting from
freely interacting groups, methods such as the Delphi technique have been
developed which involve interaction between experts under the control of the
analyst [29]. For further information on behavioural aggregation see [13, 22]
and for a recent discussion of behavioural versus mathematical approaches see
[5]. In mathematical aggregation a mathematical rule is used to combine the
judgements of the experts. There are two main ways of doing this: opinion
pools and Bayesian aggregation. In opinion pools weights are given to each ex-
pert and then judgements are combined linearly or logarithmically using these
weights. The weights can be specified based on performance of the experts
on questions to which the analyst knows the answer, the judgements of the
decision maker, self weighting by the experts or equal weights. In Bayesian
aggregation the expert judgements are regarded as data and are combined
using Bayes theorem.
The majority of the mathematical aggregation methods proposed in the liter-
ature assume that the judgements of experts are independent, both of other
judgements made by that expert, and of judgements made by other experts
[15]. In practice this may not be the case, as individual experts may be subject
to the same biases consistently, different experts may be subject to the same
biases and different experts may have similar backgrounds and experience.
Thus it seems likely that dependencies will exist within expert judgement
studies and therefore the impact of these on model accuracy should be as-
sessed.
There are some models in the literature which consider correlations, or whose
modelling could include correlations, with multiple experts. Most are in the
Bayesian aggregation literature and require the decision maker to specify the
dependencies between experts and biases of experts. Examples include [23,
34, 20]. More examples are given in [15]. An alternative to the decision maker
specifying these values is to offer the decision maker the empirical values of
the correlations from seed questions which the analyst knows the answer to
but the experts do not.
In this paper we consider the data from 45 expert studies in which the judge-
ments of multiple experts in various fields from the nuclear sector to health
and banking were elicited. The studies were conducted by TU Delft and re-
leased as part of [10]. A fuller description is given in Section 4.2. For each
study in the data set we investigate whether within expert and between ex-
pert correlations are present for all of the seed variables in that study. This
provides the most comprehensive analysis to date of the extent and type of
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dependence within expert judgement studies. Further, we also fit several of
the most commonly used mathematical aggregation methods from the liter-
ature to each of these studies and evaluate their accuracy using a number of
metrics. This allows us to make some general comments both about the types
of correlations which are present in expert judgement studies and also about
whether these correlations are having a practically significant effect on the
accuracy of the predictions resulting from the models.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the
two main approaches to mathematical aggregation, Bayesian aggregation and
opinion pooling. In Section 4.1 we consider the different possible sources of
correlation within expert judgement studies and how they might be measured
and in Section 4.2 we provide details of the expert judgement database from
TU Delft. In Section 5 we evaluate the dependence present in the TU Delft
studies and in Section 6 we fit a number of mathematical aggregation models
to the case studies and evaluate the accuracy of each model for each study.
We conclude the paper in Section 7 with a summary and discussion.
2 Mathematical Expert Judgement Approaches
2.1 Bayesian Aggregation
Suppose we are interested in an event or unknown quantity which we shall call
θ. Then the experts will give us, through an elicited probability or quantiles
of θ, individual prior distributions, f0,i(θ), for experts i = 1, . . . , E. The
set of these elicited distributions is D = (f0,1(θ), . . . , f0,E(θ)). A Bayesian
aggregation method then works by applying Bayes Theorem,
f1,DM (θ | D) ∝ f0,DM(θ)LDM(D | θ),
where f0,DM(θ) represents the decision maker’s prior probability distribution
for unknown θ, LDM(D | θ) is the decision maker’s likelihood of observing
D given θ and f1,DM(θ | D) is the decision maker’s posterior distribution for
θ.
The main challenge in this method is eliciting from the decision maker the
likelihood function LDM(D | θ). It is in this likelihood function that the cor-
relations in the expert judgement study can be captured. We see that the
outcome of Bayesian aggregation methods is a subjective probability distri-
bution which gives the updated beliefs of the decision maker in the tradition
of a subjectivist Bayesian analysis.
Some common Bayesian aggregation methods, which will be used for the com-
parison study later in the paper, are an approach based on the multivariate
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Normal distribution proposed by Winkler in [34] and a copula approach pro-
posed by Jouini and Clemen [20]. Please refer to these references for further
information on the methods.
2.2 Opinion Pooling
Opinion pooling aims to give weights to individual experts. The decision
maker’s distribution for the unknown quantity θ is then the weighted average
of all of the experts’ judgements for that quantity.
Suppose that expert i gives elicited values which result in the distribution fi(θ)
and that the weight attached to expert i is wi, 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1, where
∑E
i=1wi = 1.
Define D = (f1(θ), . . . , fE(θ)) to be the set of expert distributions for θ. The
decision maker’s consensus distribution will take one of two forms, a linear
pool
f(θ) =
E∑
i=1
wifi(θ),
or a logarithmic pool,
f(θ) = k
E∏
i=1
fi(θ)
wi ,
where k is a normalising constant to ensure that the distribution integrates
to 1. Note that in the logarithmic pool if any expert gives θ a probability of
0 then it will have a probability of 0 in the consensus distribution.
Common opinion pooling methods to be used in the comparison are the Clas-
sical Method of Roger Cooke and others [8] and an approach proposed by
Babuscia and Cheung [2].
3 Combining Model Forecasts
The work in this paper is related to the literature on combining model fore-
casts. For good overviews of the topic see [7, 1]. A great deal of work has been
carried out which indicates that combining model forecasts improves forecast
accuracy in comparison to single forecasts. Examples include [24, 32, 18]. In
particular, research has shown that we can achieve dramatic forecasting im-
provements by averaging forecasts, whether those forecasts be outputs of data
driven models or achieved by some other means.
Work in this area has looked at ideas such as minimum variance models,
Bayesian combinations and ARIMA models [7]. There is a body of evidence
from this context which suggests that using comparatively simple averaging
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methods which ignore correlations in their estimation can improve the accu-
racy of forecasts [27, 32]. Similarly, there is evidence that simple averaging
(equal weights) often outperforms sophisticated models [18].
A subset of the combining model forecasts literature has considered the combi-
nation of judgemental forecasts from, typically, experts. There has been work
carried out on achieving consensus amongst judgements, simple averaging of
judgemental forecasting, bootstrapping to model judgements using data and
work looking at the optimal number of experts to consult when combining
judgemental forecasts [7, 26]. Similarly, there has been work on the combi-
nation of forecasts using the Bayesian approach, considering the combination
of the forecasts as the posterior distribution in a Bayesian analysis [25]. A
question which is still not resolved in the literature is that of whether it is
optimal to use hard or soft methods to combine forecasts.
We can use the discussion above to place the current study within the forecast-
ing literature. We consider correlations in expert judgements. We identify,
from the largest known database of expert judgement studies, which types of
correlation are present. We then use a number of well known combination
methods for each study and compare the predictions resulting from the meth-
ods first to equal weights and then to eachother for all studies and then just
the studies in which there are high correlations. Therefore we are contribut-
ing to the literature (i) an assessment of the extent of correlations within
a large number of real judgemental studies, (ii) whether more sophisticated
methods for combining judgements outperform simple averaging (or not) and
(iii) whether methods taking into account correlations outperform those which
don’t (or not).
4 Correlations in Group Expert Judgement
Studies
4.1 Sources of Correlation
There are several different areas within mathematical group expert judgement
models in which there are potential correlations. Such correlations have the
potential to affect the accuracy of opinion pooling methods and, if each type
of correlation exists in a study, should be captured in Bayesian aggregation
methods.
In order to identify the potential correlations present in expert judgement
studies, it will be useful to consider two types of uncertainty which are rele-
vant to experts making judgements. The first is aleatory uncertainty, which
represents randomness in the state of the world. For example, if we were to roll
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a die, we are uncertain as to how many spots will end face up. It doesn’t mat-
ter how many times we have rolled the die in the past, this will always be an
uncertain event. The second type we shall consider is epistemic uncertainty,
which represents our own lack of knowledge. For example, if someone were to
hand us a loaded die then we would have additional uncertainty around how
likely we are to see a six, for example. We could reduce our uncertainty about
this event by rolling the die a large number of times and counting the number
of sixes.
The possible correlations within an expert judgement study are:
1. Correlation between the experts for individual quantities: these could
be a result of the similar past experience and common knowledge of
the experts or because the experts are susceptible to the same biases
through their use of heuristics.
2. Correlation within individual experts’ assessments of different quanti-
ties: these could be as a result of a consistent susceptibility of an expert
to the same biases.
3. Correlation between the experts for different quantities: these could be
as a result of multiple experts being consistently susceptible to the same
biases.
4. Underlying aleatory correlation between the values of the quantities to
be assessed in the expert judgement study: plotting one against another
there is a relationship.
The first three types of correlation are conditional on the true value of the
underlying variable. In the Bayesian mathematical aggregation methods there
are a further two possible correlation types. They are:
5. Underlying epistemic correlation between the quantities in the study:
learning about one quantity will inform us as to the likely value of an-
other.
6. Correlation between the experts’ judgements and the decision maker’s
judgements [15]. These could again come about as a result of common
knowledge or susceptibility to the same biases.
It seems plausible that a combination of some or all of these correlations are
present in all expert judgement studies. The methods which can be used
to assess them differ depending on the type of correlation in question, how-
ever.
The correlations between experts for individual quantities and within indi-
vidual experts for multiple quantities can be assessed empirically for a given
study using seed variables, questions which are related to the current problem
but for which the answers are known to the analyst, as long as experts are
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being asked to give values for multiple quantities. This can then be built into
aggregation methods.
The underlying correlations as a result of aleatory uncertainty between the
values of the assessed quantities can also be assessed empirically if the quan-
tities are to be observed multiple times ( i.e. could be plotted on a scatter
graph), for example as multiple identical components on test. The epistemic
correlations on the values of the quantities can be elicited from individual
experts by asking questions about their uncertainty over multiple unknowns
simultaneously.
Simply because these correlations exists within a study it does not necessarily
mean that they are having an influence on the accuracy of the outputs of
an aggregation method, however. There is of course a difference between
statistical significance and practical importance.
Consider the methods identified above. The Classical method and Babuscia
and Cheung method make the assumption that different experts are giving
independent answers for questions. That is, they assume that correlations
of types 1 and 3 above are not present. The use of seed questions makes the
implicit assumption that an individual expert’s performance on seed questions
would be similar to their performance on questions of interest. Therefore
they are all assuming a strong correlation of type 2. They are unaffected by
correlation types 4,5 and 6 as repeated measurements are not considered and
the decision maker is not involved in the aggregation process.
The multivariate Normal and Copula models include the correlations between
experts for the same question (type 1) explicitly. Similarly, both models allow
the decision maker to define a “bias” for an individual expert’s distribution
which takes into account correlation type 2. As the models discusses experts
eliciting uncertainty for a single quantity, they do not include correlations of
types 3, 4 or of 5. They do, however, include correlations of type 6.
4.2 TU Delft Expert Judgement Database
In [10], the authors explored the database of all expert judgement studies
conducted by TU Delft. In all the studies involved over 67,000 expert prob-
ability distributions. The studies have been conducted over several different
sectors, the most prominent being the nuclear industry but other notable sec-
tors where a number of studies have been carried out are the chemical and gas
industry, the aerospace sector, health, banking, volcanoes and dams.
In each study a number of seed variables are elicited from each expert. The
experts are usually asked for their median and 5% and 95% quantiles for each
variable, though in a few cases other quantiles are asked for in addition. The
experts are then asked for the same quantiles for the variables of interest for
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Figure 1: Stem and leaf plot showing the number of seed questions in each of
the Delft expert judgement studies.
which the answers are unknown and, usually, will not become known in the
future.
To illustrate the form that the data take, we will consider one specific study
from the database. The study concerned the failure frequency of gas pipelines
in the Netherlands and was conducted by TU Delft with Gasunie, the national
gas company [11]. Gasunie was interested in this in order to make maintenance
and safety decisions about their pipeline network. Fifteen experts took part
in the study, from Gasunie and a number of similar organisations in other
countries. In order to make decisions, Gasunie required one single set of
probability distributions on future failure frequencies of gas pipelines. Each
expert was asked questions on seventeen seed variables, which were taken from
overall population data on third party interference and damages found on a
large study of Dutch pipelines. It is these seed variables which we will use in
the analyses in this paper. This means that from this study we have 17x15
medians, 5% and 95% quantiles from experts for questions to which we know
the true value. Thus we are able to assess how well each expert answered each
question.
We will analyse the data from 45 studies from all experts in order to assess the
dependence present in the TU Delft expert judgement database. A summary
of the numbers of seed questions and experts are given in Figures 1 and 2. We
see from the plots that there are typically between 5 and 18 seed questions
asked to each expert in a study with a maximum of 48. On average, the
number of experts used in a study is smaller than the number of seed questions
used, often less than 10, and the maximum number of experts used is 77.
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Figure 2: Stem and leaf plot showing the number of experts in each of the
Delft expert judgement studies.
4.3 The Current Analysis
In this paper we are concerned with an analysis of 45 expert judgement stud-
ies conducted in Delft University of Technology and released as part of [10].
Within each these studies we will empirically estimate
• The correlations between the different experts for the seed questions in
each study.
• The correlations between the different assessments of individual experts
within each study.
The other correlations are outside the scope of this analysis.
We can also assess the effect that correlations are having on the accuracy of
different mathematical aggregation models. We fit the aggregation models
identified earlier to the data from each of the studies and assess the accu-
racy of the combined expert or decision maker for each method. Aggregation
methods which assume various forms of independence and dependence are
investigated to help to give an assessment of the practical significance of the
various correlations which are found to be present.
There is a question when analysing data consisting of seed variables as to how
consistently expert performance (and biases, correlations, etc) for seed vari-
ables corresponds to performance for the real questions in expert judgement
studies. We simply comment here that TU Delft work hard to ensure that
seed questions are as closely related to the variables of interest as possible
and are in the relevant field of the study. For further discussion on the stud-
ies in question see [10], and for a general discussion around seed variables in
expert judgement studies see [5], accompanying commentaries [9, 35, 33] and
response [6].
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5 Dependence in TU Delft Studies
5.1 Analysis of Studies
We initially consider as a whole every assessment from every expert in 45
studies. We assume that the median given by an expert for a seed variable
is that expert’s “best guess” at the true value of the variable. Doing so, we
can then plot each of these best guesses from each expert over the 45 studies
against the true value of the seed variable in each case. In practice we use the
natural logarithmic scale. The result is given in Figure 3. The dashed line is
y = x.
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of the log of expert medians against the log of the true
values for the seed variables from the Delft studies. The dashed line is y = x.
We see that there is certainly a relationship between the two quantities, with
expert medians increasing as the true values of the seed variables increase. The
expert assessment are also scattered both sides of the line x = y indicating
that experts both over- and under-estimate the true seed values. In fact, 46.2%
of expert assessments are above the true value and 53.8% are below.
We can also view the distributions of the logarithms of the expert assessments
and the true values of the seed variables. They are given as histograms in
Figure 4.
We see that the distributions are taking broadly the same ranges and have
similar shapes, although the expert medians appear to have a larger variance.
The variance of the logarithm of the true seed variables is 30.79 and the
variance of the logarithm of the expert medians is 32.82.
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Figure 4: Histograms of the distributions of the log value of the seed variables
and the log expert assessments.
We can also view the distributions of these quantities overlayed as density
plots and this is given in Figure 5. The true values of the variables are given
by the solid line and the expert medians are given by the dashed line.
We see that the shapes of the two distributions are very similar and it would
appear to be not unreasonable to say that the expert medians follow the same
distribution as the true values of the seed variables overall.
So far we have considered only the medians assessed by the experts for the
seed variables. As part of the Delft database the experts gave their upper and
lower 5% quantiles of their uncertainty for each of the seed variables. If the
experts are assessing the uncertainty in the seed variables accurately, 5% of
the seed variables should fall below the 5% quantile, 45% should fall between
this and the median, 45% between the median and the 95% quantile and 5%
above this. This is the basis of the calibration score in the Classical method
[8].
We call these four intervals bins 1 to 4 respectively. A plot of the proportion
of the experts’ assessments falling into these bins (dark grey) against the
theoretical proportions which should fall into each bin (light grey) is given in
Figure 6.
We see that the proportions of true values falling into the central bins is too
small whereas the proportion falling outside the 5% and 95% quantiles is too
high. The actual proportions falling into the four bins are (0.19, 0.27, 0.25, 0.29).
This shows that overall the experts have been over-confident and have assessed
90% uncertainty bounds which are too narrow. This agrees with the findings
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Figure 5: A density plot of the distributions of log value of the seed variables
and log expert assessments.
of [16, 3, 17] and others.
5.2 Dependence in the studies
Initially we consider the correlations between experts. All correlations be-
tween experts are conditional on the true value of the seed variable and de-
pend on the scale of the variable if different scales are used for seed questions.
Suppose the median for expert i on question j of study k is mi,j,k and the true
value of the seed variable is vi,jk. Then we measure the correlations between
the errors in the assessments of the experts, that is, conditional on the true
value of the seed variable,
ǫi,j,k =
mi,j,k − vi,j,k
vi,j,k
.
The true values of the seed variables are often on very different scales, even
within a single study, and even rescaling by the true value of the variable
may not completely negate the effects of this scaling. Therefore, we will use
both Pearson’s coefficient and Kendall’s Tau as our measures of correlation
between different experts. Further justification in the case of Kendall’s Tau
is given in [20].
For each of the 45 studies we calculate the Pearson and Kendall correlations
between each pair of experts. We then find minimum, lower quartile, median,
upper quartile and maximum correlations for all experts for each individual
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Figure 6: The observed proportion of seed variable falling into each of the
bins (dark grey) and the theoretical proportions if experts were assessing the
uncertainty correctly (light grey).
study and this is plotted for all studies as boxplots in the left and right hand
sides respectively of Figure 7.
We see that there are a range of different correlations between experts in the
studies using both Pearson and Kendall correlations. Most often correlations
seem to be positive and some of the maxima are very close to 1. There are also
some strong negative correlations. The range of correlations between experts
are also very different for different studies, although studies used varying
numbers of experts and seed questions. The correlations using Kendall’s Tau
seem more stable than those using Pearson correlation.
Of particular interest are strongly correlated experts. As strong is a subjec-
tive term we investigate correlations of above (0.67, 0.75, 0.9, 0.95) and their
negative counterparts. We are interested in the studies in which there is at
least one combination of experts who are correlated to this degree as they are
studies in which the usual assumption of independence between experts may
not be suitable. Table 1 shows the proportions of studies in which this is the
case for the various correlations.
We see from both the Pearson and Kendall correlations that there are many
highly positively correlated experts across the studies. 93% and 73% of the
studies have experts who are more than two thirds correlated using Pearson
and Kendall correlations respectively. This is important as these experts are
offering similar knowledge or are suffering from similar biases and so methods
which assume independence between errors in the assessments of the experts
14
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Figure 7: Boxplots representing the Pearson (left) and Kendall (right) corre-
lations for each of the 45 Delft expert judgement studies.
Table 1: Table showing the proportion of studies with at least one pair of
experts who are highly correlated.
Pearson Kendall
Positive Negative Positive Negative
0.67 0.93 0.16 0.73 0.09
0.75 0.84 0.16 0.56 0.04
0.90 0.82 0.09 0.22 0.02
0.95 0.73 0.04 0.16 0.02
may result in a forecast which is over-confident. That is, they over-estimate
the amount of unique information we recieve from the experts and so our un-
certainty on the unknown is reduced by too much. Again there are differences
between the two measures with the Pearson method displaying more very high
correlations than the Kendall method.
There are far fewer studies which contain highly negatively correlated experts,
although they do exist for all correlations in Table 1. It is important to incor-
porate negative dependence of experts into aggregation methods as negatively
correlated experts may be giving complementary information and, if indepen-
dence is assumed, may result in an answer which is under-confident. That is,
they under-estimate the amount of unique information we receive from the
experts and so our uncertainty on the unknown is not reduced enough.
We can also consider the correlations through time in individual experts within
studies. To do so, we calculate the correlations for different questions within
each expert in each study. We again calculate Pearson correlation conditional
on the true value of the variable. We can plot the distribution of the correla-
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Figure 8: Boxplots of the distributions of correlations within experts in each
of the 45 TU Delft studies.
tions for experts in each study as a boxplot and this is given for all studies in
Figure 8.
We see that the boxplots are much more closely centred towards zero indi-
cating that within expert correlations are not as prevalent as between expert
correlations in the studies. There also appear to be very few experts display-
ing large positive and negative correlations between questions. This could be
a cause for concern for those methods which utilise calibration questions to
weight experts, as it suggests that an expert who is able to predict a sin-
gle unknown well, is not necessarily going to outperform other experts for a
different unknown.
As a result of the lack of strong correlations within experts for different ques-
tions, correlations between experts for different questions will not be consid-
ered.
6 Comparison of Aggregation Approaches
6.1 Methods of Comparison
In order to compare the different mathematical aggregation techniques con-
sidered we will need to define suitable comparison measures. As many of the
studies in the Delft database have a small number of seed questions we will
use all seed variables to calculate the expert weights for each technique. These
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variables will also be used to calculate the dependence between experts for
the techniques which include these measures. The mathematical aggregation
techniques will then be assessed on the ability of the aggregated judgements
to estimate the true values of the seed variables. That is, in this paper we
consider in sample validation. To ensure that the results are robust, for each
analysis we shall also perform cross validation via leave one out analysis. That
is, we will fit the model to all but one of the seed variables and use this to
predict the remaining seed variable. We then repeat this for all of the seed
variables in a study. The cross validation results will be given in brackets
following the in sample validation results in text and tables.
The between expert correlations will be modelled using the multivariate Nor-
mal and copula approaches as it was these that were found to be prevalent in
the expert judgement studies.
To assess the accuracy of the point estimates from the aggregation methods
we shall use three criteria based on the proportion errors in the estimates
(yˆi,j − yi)/yi. The three model fit criteria we use to assess the models are the
mean absolute proportion error (MAPE), 1/N
∑N
i=1 |(yˆi,j − yi)/yi|, the root
mean squared proportion error (RMSPE) {1/N
∑N
i=1[(yˆi,j − yi)/yi]
2}0.5, and
the maximum absolute proportion error (MAXPE), maxi∈1,...,N |(yˆi,j − yi)/yi|.
We will use these metrics to compare the techniques for each study and across
studies.
6.2 Comment on Modelling
In order to perform the analysis, decisions needed to be made with regards
to both the data and the individual models. We will set these out in this
section. In order to enable comparison of all studies, decisions were taken
for all studies and hence, for a careful analysis in an individual study, each
method could potentially provide a better fit. However, the current analysis
compares the performance of an “off the shelf” version of each model. Initially
we consider the data. There were cases of experts not giving values for all of
the seed variables. These experts were removed from the analysis.
For the Multivariate Normal model, a flat prior was used for the decision
maker. The correlations between the experts were empirically estimated us-
ing the data from the seed variables from the study in question. For the
copula model, experts were assumed exchangeable and the correlation be-
tween experts was assessed from the data. The Joe copula was used between
pairs of experts. Log-normal prior distributions were used for individual vari-
ables.
For the Classical model, the optimal decision maker using both global and
item weights was calculated and the better of these was taken for each perfor-
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Figure 9: Scatter plots comparing the MAPE from Multivariate Normal, Cop-
ula, Classical and Babuscia and Change methods to equal weights.
mance measure in each study. For the Babuscia and Cheung method only the
calibration score was calculated and the weights for experts were made based
on this. That is, the probabilistic thinking score could not be calculated in
this case as the data are historical.
6.3 Results
Initially we use each of the methods to calculate the aggregated prediction,
variously the mean or median, for each seed question in each study in the
investigation. We use equal weighting of the experts as the baseline to compare
the models against. The first question is therefore; are each of the methods
outperforming equal weighting of the experts for the studies?
In Figure 9 we give scatter plots of the MAPE for each of the four aggregation
methods against equal weighting. Any points above the dashed y = x line
indicate that the aggregation approach is superior for that study.
We see that, though there are points below and above the line in all plots,
each method is outperforming equal weight more than half of the time. The
exact proportions for the Multivariate Normal, Copula, Classical and Babuscia
and Change methods are 0.60 (0.56), 0.53 (0.56), 0.62 (0.55) and 0.67 (0,58)
respectively. The equivalent scatter plots for RMSPE and MAXPE show
greater superiority over equal weights. The proportions of studies where each
of the methods are outperforming equal weights are, in the order above, 0.67
(0.8), 0.60 (0.64), 0.64 (0.6) and 0.69 (0.58) for RMSE and 0.69 (0.67),0.69
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MVN Copula Classical Babuscia Equal
MAPE 0.38 (0.44) 0.22 (0.18) 0.27 (0.16) 0.09 (0.18) 0.04 (0.04)
RMSPE 0.40 (0.60) 0.24 (0.18) 0.24 (0.13) 0.09 (0.09) 0.02 (0.00)
MAXPE 0.42 (0.38) 0.33 (0.29) 0.18 (0.20) 0.07 (0.13) 0.00 (0.00)
Table 2: The proportion of studies in which each method performs best for
each of the criteria
(0.61),0.67 (0.68), and 0.69 (0.60) for MAXPE. In general, there isn’t much
to choose from between the four methods on this metric. The cross validation
results are consistent with the in sample results.
We can also identify the best performing method under our three criteria for
each of the studies. The results of this are give in Table 2.
We see that, for all three criteria, the Multivariate Normal (MVN) method is
providing the best predictions the largest proportion of the time. Both the
Copula and Classical approaches also have good performance over the studies.
While the Babuscia method typically outperforms equal weights, it is rarely
the optimal method under any of the three criteria. Equal weighting is very
rarely the optimal weighting strategy. The cross validation results show a
slightly greater superiority for the Bayesian methods.
We can also evaluate the differences in the performance of the models in
studies with high dependence between experts. We consider high dependence
studies to be those in which at least one pair of experts have a Kendall’s Tau
of at least 0.75. There are 25 such studies. The scatterplots for each of the
methods showing their performance on MAPE compared to equal weights for
each of these studies are given in Figure 10.
In this case we see that the copula method appears to be at least as good as
equal weights on almost all occasions. The equivalent scatter plots for RMSPE
and MAXPE show greater superiority over equal weights. The proportions of
the high dependency studies in which the methods are outperforming equal
weights on MAPE are 0.60 (0.60), 0.48 (0.48), 0.52 (0.44) and 0.76 (0.48)
for the Multivariate Normal, Copula, Classical and Babuscia and Change ap-
proaches respectively. For RMSPE these proportions are 0.72 (0.76), 0.56
(0.60), 0.56 (0.44) and 0.76 (0.48) and for MAXPE they are 0.76 (0.72), 0.68
(0.72), 0.60 (0.56) and 0.76 (0.52). Overall it would appear that all meth-
ods are still outperforming equal weights on average. Interestingly here, the
cross validation shows a greater discrepancy between the Bayesian and opinion
pooling methods than the in sample validation.
We can also calculate the best performing method for each of these studies
under each of the three criteria. We give the results in Table 3.
From the table we see the dominance in these studies of the methods which
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Figure 10: Scatter plots comparing the MAPE from Multivariate Normal,
Copula, Classical and Babuscia and Cheung methods to equal weights for
high dependency studies.
MVN Copula Classical Babuscia Equal
MAPE 0.32 (0.40) 0.28 (0.24) 0.24 (0.16) 0.08 (0.12) 0.08 (0.08)
RMSPE 0.36 (0.6) 0.32 (0.24) 0.2 (0.12) 0.08 (0.04) 0.04 (0.00)
MAXPE 0.44 (0.36) 0.44 (0.44) 0.04 (0.16) 0.08 (0.04) 0.00 (0.00)
Table 3: The percentage of high dependency studies that each method per-
forms best for each of the criteria
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include correlations between the experts. That is, in all studies the methods
including dependency between experts performed best 60% of the time for
MAPE, 64% of the time for RMSPE and 75% of the time for MAXPE but
in high dependency studies these numbers rise to 60% of the time for MAPE,
68% of the time for RMSPE and 88% of the time for MAXPE. It would appear
that incoprorating dependency can lead to improved model performance. In
the case of MAPE, though the models including dependency are optimal the
same percentage of the time, the methods assuming independence are optimal
32% of the time rather than 36% of the time for all studies. These trends can
also be seen in the cross validation results.
6.4 Main Findings and implications for forecasting
The analyses conducted in Sections 5 and 6 have produced notable findings
which deserve some elaboration in the context of current debates within the
expert judgement and forecasting literatures. In particular, we consider them
with respect to Bolger and Rowe’s comparisons of mathematical aggregation
(MA) and behavioural aggregation (BA) [5] and accompanying discussants
and response [9, 35, 33, 6]. We first emphasise that we cannot compare MA
to BA as we only treat methods for MA in this paper. We are also unable to
contribute to the debate put forward by [33] as to whether any aggregation
of judgements is desirable.
In Section 5 we observed overconfidence in the overall proportions of uncer-
tainty assessments from experts falling within their 90% uncertainty limits.
This is consistent with the views put forward by Winlker [35] that “overcon-
fidence is an important issue in subjective probability forecasts, leading to
... probability distributions that are too tight” and Bolger and Rowe [6] that
“many experts are overconfident”. Cooke [9] points out that not all experts
are overconfident and this is certainly also true in the studies analysed.
We observed very strong positive correlations for errors in point predictions
between experts in expert judgement studies, and very few strong negative
correlations. We found there to be comparatively few correlations, both pos-
itive and negative, in the errors in prediction for individual experts over mul-
tiple predictions. These results have various implications as weights in MA
techniques are often sensitive to high dependence among the forecast errors
[35]. The lack off correlations within experts could be related to the assertion
[6] that accuracy in expert predictions “is not stable over experts and situ-
ations”. More comprehensive work is needed in this area to investigate this
further.
In Section 6, our comparison of mathematical aggregation methods indicated
that all methods out-performed equal weighting of experts a majority of the
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time when considering point predictions. The methods which included corre-
lations between the errors in prediction from experts performed better overall
than those which didn’t, and this preponderance showed a modest increase
as we included only the studies in which there were highly correlated experts.
This would appear to be in conflict with the view of [5] that “no significant
benefits are likely to accrue from unequal weighting in mathematical weight-
ing”. It would appear that, in the studies considered here, the MA techniques
are able to increase the accuracy of predictions over equal weighting, at the
expense of additional effort.
We have seen that dependency between experts can affect the accuracy of esti-
mates resulting from aggregation models. In particular, if there is dependency
present, there is some evidence that assessments of unknowns are improved
by choosing a model which takes these into account. This is in contrast to
findings in forecasting from, for example, [27, 32]. Similarly, in our analysis
we found that more complex aggregation models outperformed simple aver-
aging. Again, this is in contrast to a body of previous work, including that of
[18, 7].
The specific judgemental techniques considered in this paper could have par-
ticular utility in forecasting. A much considered problem in forecasting is the
combination of multiple data driven forecasts. De Menezes et al [12] review
the techniques used to do so and conclude that it is important to consider
the uncertainty, rather than simply the point estimate, when deciding on the
method to combine. We would argue from the results in this paper that, if we
wish to combine forecasts from experts for a quantity on which we have no
or little relevant data, then a combination of the assessments in Section 6.1
and and a measure of uncertainty should be used to choose the aggregation
technique. Of course, this assumes that we wish to use mathematical rather
than behavioural aggregation, which may not always be the case.
One advantage forecasting has over other areas in which expert judgement is
used, is that often the true values of the unknowns will be revealed at some
point in the future. For example, the near future local climate behaviour in
[14] and the unemployment and inflation rates of [19]. The result is that the
choice of seed questions, one of the most difficult tasks in mathematical aggre-
gation, could reduce to asking questions about values to be revealed sooner
than those of interest. This could potentially improve the performance of
mathematical aggregation approaches in comparison to studies in, for exam-
ple, risk analysis, where probabilities are typically elicited but only one reality
is observed.
In financial forecasting, most interest lies in the extremes of the data, in the
peaks and troughs of financial performance. Unfortunately, this is where data
is most scarce and forecasts from widely used models such as the Gaussian
copula have been shown to be very poor [30] as a result of the presence of
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tail dependence. Expert judgement aggregation could play an important role
in improving forecasts under multiple types of dependence in such cases, as
the judgements of a single expert are unlikely to be judged sufficient in such
cases..
7 Summary and Discussion
Overall, we conclude that there is evidence of strong dependencies between
experts in expert judgement studies but little evidence of within expert corre-
lations. Further, we found some evidence that taking these correlations into
account in models could improve forecasts.
While there are models in the Bayesian literature which take both of these
types of dependence into account, there is to date no method which includes
all of the correlations identified in Section 4.1.
This paper has considered dependency within and between experts in expert
judgement studies. Another issue of importance is that of eliciting depen-
dencies between unknowns from experts. This is of particular relevance in
forecasting, where correlations at both a single point in time and through
time could have strong effects on the accuracy of forecasting models.
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